I wanted to write up some thoughts here on what I think about whether or not Prime Minister Srettha Thavisin could see his premiership come to a premature end on Wednesday. The Constitutional Court is due to rule on the petition submitted by a group of (now former) senators which alleged that the prime minister had appointed Pichit Chuenban to the role of minister attached to the PM’s Office despite knowing that he did not meet the legal requirements. (To catch up on what this case is all about, here is a succinct summary).
Why does the outcome here feel so uncertain?
The Constitutional Court’s ruling last week on the fate of the Move Forward Party was momentous, but felt like an inevitability given that the same court had ruled back in January that the party sought to overthrow the political system. By contrast, the court has sent signals that feel much more mixed with Srettha’s case. The court voted by 6 to 3 to accept the senators’ petition, and then by 5 to 4 not to suspend Srettha while the court was deliberating on the case. (Previously, former prime minister Prayut Chan-o-cha had been suspended in 2022 while the court considered the issue of his term limits). The lack of unanimity by which the Constitutional Court has approached these questions, while separate from the issue of whether Srettha had breached ethical standards, makes it much more difficult for us to take the pulse of the court on this matter.
On purely the legal merits, Srettha’s defense rests on arcane legal technicalities. But prime ministers have been ousted for less; Samak Sundaravej, a Thaksinite prime minister in the mid-2000s, was removed from office for hosting a cooking show, while Yingluck Shinawatra was removed in 2014 for improperly transferring an official. But I could also easily imagine an outcome where the court argues that the loopholes presented by Srettha’s legal team is sufficient to prevent a guilty verdict.
The strictly judicial processes aside, it is also difficult to read the wider political landscape surrounding this matter. The ex-senators that had initiated this case were aligned with former deputy prime minister Prawit Wongsuwan, the leader of the Palang Pracharath Party who was one of the most powerful triumvirs in the previous government. Prawit’s brother is still one of the deputy prime ministers, but Prawit’s personal influence appears to have been sharply diminished since Pheu Thai took power. The Senate which he held so much sway over has slipped outside his orbit, and the MPs in his party are reported to be more closely aligned with secretary-general Thammanat Promphao. But given that he reportedly still harbors prime ministerial ambitions, ousting Srettha might be his last, best chance at securing the premiership for himself.
Yet it doesn’t appear that other conservative figures are on the same page with him on this matter. Shortly after Srettha was faced with this court case, he brought in former deputy prime minister Wissanu Kruea-ngarm to join his legal team. Wissanu is one of Thailand’s most prominent legal minds who has served essentially almost every government of all political shades in various roles dating back to the 1990s. Beyond simply adding indisputable clout to Srettha’s defense, however, some media reports have speculated that he could only have returned after being given the green light by major politicians in the conservative camp. All of this makes it difficult to predict what will happen on Wednesday.
What would happen if Srettha is removed?
This question is more straightforward to answer. Firstly, Srettha’s removal from office would lead to the immediate liquidation of his government, with every minister immediately losing their posts as well. The onus would then fall on the House of Representatives to select a new prime minister.
Some major factors to consider: the Senate no longer has the power to select a prime minister with the lower house. Pita Limjaroenrat, the candidate from the now-defunct Move Forward Party, is no longer eligible for the post as he has been banned from politics for ten years. In addition, I believe that Srettha himself would actually be eligible for re-nomination for the post. Back in 2008, when Samak was removed for hosting his cooking show, he actually made a brief attempt to regain the premiership (the bid collapsed and Somchai Wongsawat was made prime minister instead). So, if Pheu Thai had the will for it, a Srettha removal does not automatically equal a permanent end to his prime ministerial career.
If Pheu Thai for whatever reasons judges that Srettha’s re-nomination would be unwise, that would open a political can of worms. Parliament can only easily select from a bank of candidates submitted at the 2023 general election. Pheu Thai has two other candidates: Thaksin’s daughter Paethongtharn Shinawatra, usually judged as too green, and Chaikasem Nitisiri, reportedly too sickly. Can Pheu Thai let the premiership fall out of its hands, however? The person with the next best claim would be Bhumjaithai’s Anutin Charnvirakul, as he leads the second biggest party in the coalition. Recently, we have seen signs that Anutin and Thaksin are moving closer to each other: Pheu Thai relented on its opposition to Bhumjaithai’s signature marijuana policy, and the pair were amicably golfing in recent weeks. Both Srettha and Anutin deny that the latter is any sort of “backup” PM candidate — but I would take this with a healthy grain of salt.
And what if Srettha isn’t removed?
We’re getting ahead of ourselves, but I would venture one guess: something will be done about Palang Pracharath’s status in the coalition. Thaksin was not subtle when he mentioned that the “people in the forest house” — a reference to Prawit’s forest conservation charity, which serves as his personal headquarters — has been causing trouble. The attempt to terminate Srettha’s premiership is the most prominent of this. There are persistent rumors that Pheu Thai may remove Prawit from the coalition, keeping only the MPs aligned with Thammanat — and to make up the numbers, they may instead invite the Democrat Party into the government. A cabinet reshuffle is widely rumored for later this month or in September: if Srettha survives that long, we will likely see a lot more clarity on the dynamics of the coalition by then.
Before wrapping up, I want to also point out that one of the most confusing things about this case is that it is difficult to read what it means on the state of the “grand compromise” between the Thaksinites and the conservatives. (I have a deep dive into the nature of the grand compromise here). Srettha himself as a figure appears to largely be an expendable figure for Pheu Thai: he is not more personally popular than the party, lacks an independent electoral base, and most importantly is not a Shinawatra. So on the chess board of politics, Srettha’s removal isn’t by itself a sign that the grand compromise is falling apart. But given the murky state of our knowledge of the dynamics of the grand compromise between the conservative parties and Pheu Thai, what Srettha and his survival ultimately means is just unclear. Sometimes the best thing an analyst can say when asked about what a political event may mean is: we don’t have enough information to say for sure.